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An ongoing dispute among district courts as to the scope of inter 
partes review estoppel1 provides a useful set for later examination of game 
theory perspectives on repeat players and institutional actors within the pa-
tent ecosystem: the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, District Courts, Peti-
tioners, and Plaintiffs. While the Federal Circuit would normally be ex-
pected to rapidly address this ongoing rift, the potential alteration of the 
issue by the Supreme Court through SAS Inst., Inc. v. Matal may give the 
Circuit pause and provide a greater window for future study.2 
 
Senior Lecturer, Monash Business School, Monash University; Empirical IP Fellow, Chicago-Kent 
College of Law. The author would like to thank Professors Edward Lee and Professor Greg Reilly for 
their support.   
 1.  For a quick primer on this issue, see Jonathan R. Bowser, IPR Estoppel: District Courts Are 
Questioning the Reasoning of Shaw but are Compelled to Follow It, 29 NO. 10 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. 
L.J. 20 (2017).  
 2.  825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (May 22, 2017) (No. 16-969) 
(argued Nov. 27, 2017).  
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The America Invents Act of 20113 provides for patent challenges at 
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB or the “Board”) through a proce-
dure known as inter partes review (IPR).4 A patent challenger files a peti-
tion noting the grounds upon which specific claims of a patent may be in-
valid. The PTAB, in reviewing the petition(s), may elect to institute review 
only on claims that establish a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability and 
may cull redundant or otherwise weak grounds.5 The PTAB then considers 
and renders written judgment only as to those instituted claims in light of 
those grounds.6 
As a parallel track that may simplify litigation, parties in district court 
patent actions may seek a stay pending IPR.7 However, much of the simpli-
fication inherent in IPR relies on the estoppel effect of IPR.8 If petitioner-
defendants are able to utilize known prior art and combinations in both IPR 
and patent actions, the winnowing of issues will be greatly limited.9 Ac-
cordingly, the estoppel provision of the act, 35 U.S.C. Section 315(e)(2), 
provides that a patent challenger in U.S. District Court or the ITC that also 
seeks IPR “may not assert” any invalidity ground in the patent case that it 
“raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.”10 
 
 3.  Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.). 
 4.  35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2012). 
 5.  37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2018); see also Jason German & Wayne Stacy, Prepare for More Estop-
pel if the Supreme Court Reverses Federal Circuit on Partial IPR Institutions, IP WATCHDOG (Jun. 25, 
2017) http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/25/prepare-more-estoppel-supreme-court-reverses-federal-
circuit-partial-institutions/id=84826/ (finding the PTAB partially instituted 50% of the time in 2013 and 
23% of the time in 2016).  
 6.  This is the very issue of SAS Inst., Inc. v. Matal. See 825 F.3d 1341, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 
2160 (May 22, 2017) (No. 16-969) (concerning the validity of this practice in light of Section 318(a)).  
 7.  Numerous academics have addressed the interesting strategic avenues introduced by this par-
allel system. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Du-
al Ptab and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 45 (2016); see also Jonathan 
Stroud, Linda Thayer & Jeffrey C. Totten, Stay Awhile: The Evolving Law of District Court Stays in 
Light of Inter Partes Review, Post-Grant Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant Review, 11 
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226, 227 (2015); W. Michael Schuster, Invalidity Assertion Entities and Inter 
Partes Review: Rent Seeking as a Tool to Discourage Patent Trolls, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1163 
(2016). 
 8.  See Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., 817 F.3d 1293, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The 
loss of this efficiency is a constant complaint of district courts struggling with Shaw.  
 9.  See, e.g., Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15CV21, 2017 WL 2605977, at *3 
(E.D. Va. June 5, 2017) (“It would waste this Court’s time to allow a stay for a year during IPR pro-
ceedings and then review invalidity arguments that Defendants could (and perhaps should) have raised 
in their IPR petition.”). 
 10.  “The petitioner in an inter partes review . . . that results in a final written decision . . . may not 
assert either in a civil action [in district court] or in [an ITC investigation] that the claim is invalid on 
any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.” 35 
U.S.C. § 315(e)(1).  
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The prior understanding of that provision was that estoppel attached 
broadly, giving the petitioning party incentive to focus on the best invalidi-
ty grounds while also providing a reasonably wide canvas of other invali-
dating grounds and art, all within the petitions’ constrained pages.11 How-
ever, the Federal Circuit disturbed this understanding by announcing a far 
narrower reach of estoppel, first in Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated 
Creel Sys., Inc.,12 and again in HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC.13 
In the former case, the Petitioner had petitioned for IPR bringing three 
grounds against interposing claims.14 The Board instituted only on two of 
those three grounds, denying institution of the third ground “as redundant 
in light of [its] determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
challenged claims are unpatentable based on the grounds of unpatentability 
on which we institute an inter partes review.”15 Petitioner later sought re-
view of the ground that was not instituted as redundant. The Petitioner 
sought a writ of mandamus “instructing the PTO to reevaluate its redun-
dancy decision and to institute IPR based on the [non-instituted] ground,” 
arguing that extraordinary relief was necessary as it would be estopped 
from bringing that non-instituted ground in district court.16 
The Court denied the writ. In short, the Federal Circuit read the “dur-
ing that inter partes review” section text as applying only to instituted 
grounds, on the basis that the IPR only occurs when review is actually in-
stituted.17 Thus, petitioner’s petitioned but not instituted ground, which was 
rejected without a merits review, was never part of the IPR and accordingly 
was not estopped.18 
Before exploring the potential meaning of Shaw, it is helpful to review 
four categories of challenges that will come into play. 
 
 
 11.  See, e.g., Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp., No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 18, 2016), judgment entered, 2016 WL 7013478 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2016); Note, Recasting the 
U.S. International Trade Commission’s Role in the Patent System, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2337, 2342 
(2013) (presenting broad estoppel as non-controversial point). 
 12.  817 F.3d at 1293. 
 13.  817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the noninstituted grounds do not become a part of the 
IPR. Accordingly, the noninstituted grounds were not raised and, as review was denied, could not be 
raised in the IPR.”); see also Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1299 (MPHJ’s citation of Shaw guards against accusa-
tions that the estoppel discussion in Shaw was mere dicta, as the court found it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to 
review the Board’s decision not to institute IPR on the [redundant] ground.”).  
 14.  Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1296. 
 15.  Id. at 1297 (internal citations omitted, internal quotations omitted, and emphasis in original). 
 16.  Id. at 1299.  
 17.  Id. at 1300 (emphasis in original).  
 18.  Id. 
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1) Instituted Ground – a prior art ground advanced by petitioner 
on which the PTAB institutes review of a claim; 
2) Non-Petitioned Ground –a prior art ground not advanced by 
petitioner;19 
3) Non-Instituted Non-Procedural – a prior art ground advanced 
by petitioner on which the PTAB does not institute review due 
to merits or discretion; and 
4) Non-Instituted Procedural – a prior art ground advanced by 
petitioner on which the PTAB does not institute review due a 
procedural reason, such as redundancy in light of other insti-
tuted grounds. 
 
The exact meaning of Shaw has befuddled the district courts, as the 
meaning of “reasonably could have raised” is hard to square with the literal 
reading of Shaw. The difficulty of applying Shaw is further complicated by 
two obstacles: first, the Federal Circuit did not have cause to address non-
petitioned grounds, and second, a narrowing of estoppel would potentially 
give patent challengers two bites at the apple, thereby weakening the pur-
poseful streamlining implicit in the very creation of the IPR process. 
In light of the Federal Circuit’s arguable silence on this issue and the 
particular salience of an issue impacting district court dockets, lower courts 
have been exploring the contours of Shaw. The district courts have split in-
to three camps with regard to the estoppel exemption: 
 
1) Broad Shaw: Estoppel applies only to instituted grounds. 
Thus, petitioners are not estopped for grounds that were peti-
tioned but denied, as well as for grounds that were not peti-
tioned, even if those grounds were known or capable of being 
found with a diligent search. 
2) Narrow Shaw: Shaw’s estoppel exemption applies only to pe-
titioned but rejected grounds. Thus, the petitioners are es-
topped for grounds that were instituted, as well as for non-
petitioned grounds that could have been raised had the peti-
tioner been reasonably diligent. 
3) Extremely Narrow Shaw: Shaw’s estoppel exemption applies 
only to the unique facts of Shaw. That is, the exemption ap-
 
 19.  For the purposes of this Article, assume that non-petitioned grounds involve art that a “skilled 
searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to discover.” 157 CONG. 
REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
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plies only to petitioned grounds that were rejected for proce-
dural reasons, e.g., redundancy. 
 
The chart below summarizes the reach of estoppel as to grounds in the 
view of the relevant judicial camps: 
 
 Instituted 
Grounds 
Non-
Petitioned 
Grounds 
Reasonably 
Known 
Petitioned 
Grounds, 
Not Insti-
tuted for 
non-
Procedural 
Reason 
Petitioned 
Grounds, 
Not Insti-
tuted for 
Procedural 
Reason 
Broad 
Shaw 
Estopped    
Narrow 
Shaw 
Estopped Estopped   
Extremely 
Narrow 
Shaw 
Estopped Estopped Estopped  
 
I. NOTABLE CASES IN THE RESPECTIVE CAMPS 
To better understand the logic and posture of these respective camps, 
it is helpful to review notable cases within each. 
A. Broad Application of Shaw 
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp is notable in that Judge 
Robinson applies Shaw broadly while simultaneously lambasting the logic 
underpinning the Federal Circuit’s opinion.20 Judge Robinson wrote, “Alt-
hough extending [this] logic to prior art references that were never present-
ed to the PTAB at all (despite their public nature) confounds the very pur-
pose of this parallel administrative proceeding, the court cannot divine a 
reasoned way around the Federal Circuit’s interpretation in Shaw.”21 Judge 
 
 20.  221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del. 2016) (citing Shaw, 817 F.3d 1293).  
 21.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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Robinson’s opinion in denying reconsideration again signaled that the issue 
needed to be addressed by the Federal Circuit on appeal.22 
Koninklijke Philips N.V. And Philips Lighting North America Corp., v. 
Wangs Alliance Corp.23 is an important case as it runs counter to the appar-
ent shift typified by Oil Dri24 towards a restrictive reading of Shaw. While 
the court notes that there is “much appeal in a broader reading of the estop-
pel provision,” it held that estoppel did not apply to non-petitioned claims 
because “Shaw held that . . . ‘during inter partes review’ applies only to the 
period of time after the PTAB has instituted review.”25 
B. Narrow Application of Shaw 
Douglass Dynamics v. Myer Prods. announced common themes of 
district courts that are compelled to follow Shaw but seek to limit its im-
pact.26 Namely, that the lack of estoppel will prevent a stay from simplify-
ing issues in surviving civil litigation and undermines the legislative intent 
of the law. Accordingly, the court applied Shaw to petitioned, non-
instituted grounds, but found that known, non-petitioned grounds were es-
topped. “Shaw’s narrow view of § 315(e) estoppel undermines the purport-
ed efficiency of IPR, [and that u]nder this approach, IPR is not an alterna-
tive to litigating validity in the district court, it is an additional step in the 
process.”27 
Oil Dri Corp. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co. is a vital “narrow Shaw” 
case, that forcefully sets out the reasoning for applying Shaw’s estoppel ex-
emption to petitioned, non-instituted grounds.28 Specifically, applying es-
toppel to “noninstituted (but petitioned-for) grounds—which the PTAB de-
clines to fully consider—deprives a party of ‘a full and fair opportunity to 
be heard on the estopped ground’” whereas  “[estopping] a party [who] 
 
 22.  Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., Civ. No. 13-453-SLR, 2017 WL 107980, at *2 
(D. Del. Jan. 11, 2017). 
 23.  CA No. 14-12298-DJC, 2018 WL 283893 (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 2018). 
 24.  Oil Dri Corp. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 1-15-CV-01067, 2017 WL 3278915 (N.D. Ill., 
Aug. 2, 2017). 
 25.  Koninklijke Philips, 2018 WL 283893, at *4. 
 26.  No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 1382556 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017). 
 27.  Id. at *4; see also Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15CV21, 2017 WL 
2605977, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2017) (“It would waste this Court’s time to allow a stay for a year dur-
ing IPR proceedings and then review invalidity arguments that Defendants could (and perhaps should) 
have raised in their IPR petition."). 
 28.  2017 WL 3278915, at *9. 
    
2018 I FOUGHT THE SHAW: A GAME THEORY FRAMEWORK 417 
fails to raise a claim that it reasonably could have raised . . . is . . . fair—as 
the party could only blame itself.”29 
C. Very Narrow Application of Shaw 
Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. represents a clear outlier, with the 
court doing all in its power to cabin the effects of Shaw.30  
 
The Court recommends adopting the narrow view of Shaw 
and HP . . . . Namely, the Court reads Shaw and HP to ex-
empt an IPR petitioner from § 315(e)’s estoppel provision 
only if the PTAB precludes the petitioner from raising a 
ground during the IPR proceeding for purely procedural 
reasons, such as redundancy . . . . Section 315(e) estops 
[defendant] from asserting at trial: (1) grounds for which 
the PTAB instituted IPR and determined those grounds to 
be insufficient to establish unpatentability after a trial on 
the merits; (2) grounds included in a petition but deter-
mined by the PTAB to not establish a reasonable likeli-
hood of unpatentability (in other words, administrative re-
view on the merits of a ground); and (3) grounds not 
included in a petition that a ‘skilled searcher conducting a 
diligent search reasonably could have been expected to 
discover.’ . . . [Defendant] is not estopped from asserting 
grounds included in a petition but which the PTAB found 
redundant or declined to institute review for another proce-
dural reason.31 
II. THE TRENDS OF THE DISTRICT COURTS AND THE SILENT 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
A review of case law shows a trend toward the narrow Shaw ap-
proach,32 unsurprising in light of the perceived inefficiencies of the broad 
 
 29. Id. 
 30.  No. 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See, e.g., Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL 
3278915, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017); Cobalt Boats, 2017 WL 2605977, at *3; Douglas Dynamics, 
LLC v. Meyer Prod. LLC, No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 1382556, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017), 
reh’g granted in part, No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 2116714 (W.D. Wis. May 15, 2017); Parallel 
Networks Licensing, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., CA No.13-2072 (KAJ), 2017 WL 1045912, at 
*11 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017); Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., No. 14-CV-1296-JPS, 2017 
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Shaw camp. However, the recent Koninklijke decision signals potential on-
going judicial constraint motivating at least some courts to buck this 
trend.33 Courts that do adopt a broad Shaw reading appear to do so grudg-
ingly, as both Koninklijke and Intellectual Ventures note the appeal of a 
narrow Shaw reading before following the interpreted will of the Federal 
Circuit. There appears to be at least one intra-district split, with the District 
of Delaware adopting both the narrow Shaw approach in Parallel Networks 
Licensing, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,34 and the broad Shaw approach 
in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp.35 
The Federal Circuit is not stepping in to address this rift. It has reject-
ed as least one mandamus,36 and does not appear to be in any hurry to 
weigh in. This may be due in part to the potential effects of SAS, which 
may alter the practice of partial institutions. In SAS, the Federal Respondent 
framed the issues thusly:  
 
Section 318(a) of the Patent Act provides that, if the Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO) institutes an inter partes re-
view, the agency’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board “shall is-
sue a final written decision with respect to the patentability 
of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any 
new claim added” during the proceeding. 35 U.S.C. 318(a). 
The question presented is as follows: Whether, in a case in 
which the PTO agrees to review the patentability of only a 
subset of the claims in a patent, the Board may address in 
its final written decision only the patentability of those 
claims the agency agreed to review.37 
 
 
WL 4220457, at *25 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 22, 2017); Network-1 Techs., Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., 
No. 6:11-CV-492-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 4478236, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2017). 
 33.  See Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL 235048, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017). For a greater discussion of constraint and judicial splits, see Brian 
Sheppard & Andrew Moshirnia, For the Sake of Argument: A Behavioral Analysis of Whether and How 
Legal Argument Matters in Decisionmaking, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 537, 555 (2013). 
 34.  No. CV 13-2072 (KAJ), 2017 WL 1045912, at *11 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017) (noting litigant 
was estopped from bringing claims based on prior art combinations of which it was aware before it filed 
its IPR petitions, though the court does not mention Shaw). 
 35.  221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 554 (D. Del. 2016). 
 36.  See In re Verinata Health, Inc., No. 2017-109, 2017 WL 1422489, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 
2017). 
 37.  Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition, at I, SAS Inst., Inc. v. Matal, 137 S. Ct. 2160 
(2017) (No. 16-969), 2017 WL 1291696, at *I. 
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SAS concerns the ability of the PTAB to address only particular 
claims. However, if the Board may no longer issue piecemeal decisions as 
to claims, it may reasonably impact the Board’s approach to piecemeal 
handling of grounds. 
III. WHEN RULES CHANGE, GAMING FOLLOWS 
The differences between the Pre- and Post-Shaw approaches, and be-
tween the Post-Shaw approaches themselves, provide a wealth of potential 
trends to test for. 
Specifically, the values of various grounds that are not instituted are 
no longer uniform: 
 
1) Petitioned, but Not Instituted Grounds are More Valuable 
Post-Shaw—The Post-Shaw approach shared by the broad and 
narrow camp is the treatment of petitioned, non-instituted 
grounds as exempt from estoppel. 
2) The Narrow Application of Shaw Restricts Petitioners—The 
narrow application of Shaw may force petitioners to abandon 
any ground that reasonably could have been included in the 
IPR petition. The extreme narrow application of Shaw further 
limits petitioners. 
3) Grounds Rejected for Procedural Reasons are Superior to 
Grounds Rejected on Abbreviated Merits—The extremely 
narrow application of Shaw elevates procedural rejections of 
petition grounds, e.g., for redundancy, than those that fail to 
present a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability. 
 
The disparate value of non-instituted grounds and the potential uncer-
tainty with regard to estoppel effect will invite gaming by the relevant ac-
tors. The following hypothetical trends should be examined. 
A. Greater Forum Shopping by Plaintiffs 
With district courts taking very different views of estoppel, plaintiffs 
may seek to file suit in districts that apply a narrow interpretation of Shaw 
in an attempt to restrict defendant petitioners. Such a move may be difficult 
to detect, as estoppel considerations are not the only factors driving the 
rampant forum shopping in patent litigation. It is worth noting that the 
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Eastern District of Texas, the poster child for forum shopping and judge 
shopping38 in matters of patent litigation, has seemingly embraced a narrow 
view of Shaw.39 More importantly, the Supreme Court constrained the abil-
ity to forum shop in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 
further muddying the ability to detect a clear forum bias.40 
B. More Grounds Brought by Petitioners Spread Across More 
Petitions 
As it is unclear whether non-petitioned grounds will be subject to es-
toppel, petitioners have much greater incentive to bring all available 
grounds across multiple petitions. Petitioners would also likely bring re-
dundant grounds, as a non-institution on redundant grounds would be most 
immune from estoppel. As estoppel does not attach on non-instituted 
claims, petitioners could file multiple petitions, with each populated by 
claims of relatively the same strength.41 It would be worth exploring if the 
number of petitions per patent increases, while noting the number of claims 
per patent within those multiple petition challenges. Should this gaming 
become obvious, the Board may respond by denying multiple petitions 
based on duplicative art.42 
 
 38. Jonas Anderson, Judge Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 539, 
544 (2016) (explaining how judge shopping occurs in the Eastern District of Texas). 
 39.  See Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7 
(E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017); see also Infernal Tech., LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 2:15-CV-01523-JRG-
RSP, 2016 WL 9000458, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016) (discussing lack of simplification inherent to 
a broad Shaw approach); Network-1 Techs. Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., No. 6:11-CV-492-RWS-
KNM, 2017 WL 4478236, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2017). 
 40.  137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017). Commentators differ as to the efficacy of this effort. Bryan A 
Kohm & Jonathan T. McMichael, Forum Shopping Tactics After TC Heartland, LEXOLOGY.COM (July 
27, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d318fbd1-16e8-416b-9eeb-181c82ba720a; 
see also Josh Landau, TC Heartland Attacks The Heart Of Patent Forum Shopping, PAT. PROGRESS 
(May 23, 2017), https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/05/23/tc-heartland-attacks-heart-of-patent-forum-
shopping/; Tom McParland, So Much for ‘TC Heartland’ Effect. One Apple Store Enough for Venue, 
Judge Says, LAW.COM (Aug. 14, 2017) https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/08/10/judge-single-
apple-store-makes-delaware-venue-proper-for-patent-litigation-against-tech-
giant/?slreturn=20180017135716. A common concern is that TC Heartland is merely overloading the 
District of Delaware. Lauren H. Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolling Isn’t 
Dead—It’s Just Moving to Delaware, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 28, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/patent-
trolling-isnt-dead-its-just-moving-to-delaware. 
 41.  Jason German & Wayne Stacy, Prepare for More Estoppel if the Supreme Court Reverses 
Federal Circuit on Partial IPR Institutions, IP WATCHDOG (June 25, 2017), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/25/prepare-more-estoppel-supreme-court-reverses-federal-circuit-
partial-institutions/id=84826/. 
 42.  See id. 
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C. District Courts Requiring Judicial Estoppel For Stays 
District courts may seek to limit the impact of Shaw by requesting that 
parties stipulate to be estopped in line with Pre-Shaw or very Narrow Shaw 
approaches. This appears to have been the case in Infernal Tech., LLC v. 
Elec. Arts Inc.43 There, the court noted, “the question of issue simplifica-
tion in a case emerging from IPR with claims withstanding challenge de-
pends on whether the Court will be required to assess the uncertain scope 
of IPR estoppel, and whether the parties will be required to relitigate inva-
lidity issues already litigated at the PTAB.”44 Accordingly, the only way 
that, “the Court can ensure that the issues would truly be simplified under 
the current state of the law” was if  
 
[defendant] stipulates that for any claims surviving IPR, 
[defendant] will not assert a defense under §§ 102 or 103 
based on prior art that it raised or reasonably could have 
raised in its IPR petitions, including any applicable refer-
ences cited in [defendant]’s invalidity contentions or relied 
upon by [defendant]’s expert witness in his opening expert 
report regarding invalidity.45 
CONCLUSION 
The Shaw rift will eventually need to be addressed, either directly by 
the Federal Circuit or obliquely by the Supreme Court. As IPR estoppel is 
an issue with high salience to repeat players, one would expect dynamic 
strategies to result. Empirical study of filings can test for these hypothetical 
patterns and provide opportunities for additional insight into actors in the 
patent ecosystem. 
 
 
 43.  No. 2:15-CV01523-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 9000458, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016); see also 
Lighting Sci. Grp. Corp. v. Shenzhen Jiawei Photovoltaic Lighting Co., No. 16-CV-03886-BLF, 2017 
WL 2633131, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2017). 
 44.  Infernal, 2016 WL 9000458, at *4. 
 45.  Id. at *5. 
